

Secret Networks, Global Power, and the Biblical End-Time Conflict

PART V

INSTITUTIONAL POWER, CULTURE, AND COVERT ACTION

CHAPTER 12

FOUNDATIONS, EDUCATION, CULTURE, AND THE ENGINEERING OF CONSENT

*Philanthropic Power, Knowledge Production, Behavioral Governance,
and the Formation of Public Consciousness*

Sixbert SANGWA

Open Christian Press

2026

OPEN ACCESS | CC BY 4.0

CHAPTER DOI [10.65655/ocp.m21.c36](https://doi.org/10.65655/ocp.m21.c36)

BOOK DOI [10.65655/ocp.m21](https://doi.org/10.65655/ocp.m21)

Chapter 12: Foundations, Education, Culture, and the Engineering of Consent

Copyright: (c) 2026 Sixbert SANGWA

Edition: First independent chapter edition, 2026

Chapter DOI: <https://doi.org/10.65655/ocp.m21.c36>

Book DOI: <https://doi.org/10.65655/ocp.m21>

Publisher: Open Christian Press, a publishing imprint of Open Christian University and Center for Faith and Work

Publisher website: <https://press.openchristian.education>

Publisher correspondence: editor@openchristian.education

Author correspondence: ssangwa@openchristian.education

License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), subject to third-party source rights.

Scripture notice

Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture references are to the Christian Standard Bible. Scripture quotations are from the Christian Standard Bible, Copyright 2017 by Holman Bible Publishers. Used by permission. Christian Standard Bible and CSB are federally registered trademarks of Holman Bible Publishers.

Suggested citation

SANGWA, S. (2026). Foundations, education, culture, and the engineering of consent. In *Pawns, Powers, and Principalities: Secret Networks, Global Power, and the Biblical End-Time Conflict*. Open Christian Press. <https://doi.org/10.65655/ocp.m21.c36>

RESEARCH NOTE

This chapter examines philanthropy, education, social science, public relations, entertainment, behavioral science, journalism funding, and related institutions as mechanisms through which durable social priorities can be formed. It uses foundation archives, congressional records, official financial disclosures, primary writings on public opinion and propaganda, public grant records, and specialist scholarship. Investigative works are treated as sources of hypotheses and documentary leads rather than as self-authenticating proof. Current institutional materials were checked through August 16, 2026. The chapter distinguishes donor intention from grantee autonomy, agenda-setting from command, persuasion from coercion, openly declared social reform from covert manipulation, and documented cultural influence from claims of a single hidden directorate.

EVIDENTIARY LANGUAGE

ESTABLISHED | STRONGLY SUPPORTED | PLAUSIBLE | CONTESTED | WEAKLY SUPPORTED | UNSUPPORTED

These labels describe the relationship between a claim and the evidence located. They do not replace argument and do not convert uncertainty into certainty.

CHAPTER 12

FOUNDATIONS, EDUCATION, CULTURE, AND THE ENGINEERING OF CONSENT

Philanthropic Power, Knowledge Production, Behavioral Governance, and the Formation of Public Consciousness

"Do not be conformed to this age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind." [Romans 12:2](#) (CSB)

1. The Power to Decide What Society Learns

Political power is easiest to recognize when it wears a uniform, signs a decree, collects a tax, sends a police officer, or counts a vote. Cultural power is more difficult to see because it often acts earlier. Long before a legislature chooses among policies, institutions help decide which problems deserve study, which vocabulary is legitimate, which experts are credible, which causes attract money, which research programs survive, which stories become visible, and which habits a society teaches to its children. The state can compel. Culture can normalize. Philanthropy can finance the institutions that do the normalizing without itself possessing statutory authority.

That distinction is the starting point for this chapter. A private foundation cannot ordinarily enact a law, command a ministry, or imprison a dissenter. Yet a foundation with a large endowment can support a field of research for decades, establish fellowships, sustain a university center, finance professional associations, commission reports, support public-interest litigation, fund journalism, sponsor documentaries, cultivate civic organizations, and underwrite demonstration projects that later become models for government. The resulting influence may be beneficial, harmful, mixed, or simply contested. Its democratic significance does not depend on proving a secret conspiracy. It follows from the asymmetry of resources and the ability to convert private wealth into durable public agenda-setting capacity.

Chapter 9 established the narrower point that grantmaking can help produce policy knowledge and that funding a topic does not by itself prove control over a conclusion. That distinction must govern everything that follows. The present chapter moves beyond think tanks to the deeper cultural infrastructure: education, social science, public communication, mass persuasion, entertainment, behavioral design, journalism, and the professional institutions that tell modern societies what counts as authoritative knowledge. The question is not whether every funded scholar obeys a donor. The question is how repeated funding decisions structure the environment in which scholars, journalists, educators, artists, officials, and citizens make choices.

Political theorist Rob Reich identifies a genuine democratic tension in private foundations. They can support pluralism, experimentation, long time horizons, and work that electoral politics neglects. At the same time, they are created by private wealth, enjoy public tax advantages, and are not directly accountable to voters in the way governments are. Their distinctive freedom from ordinary political cycles is therefore both a potential public benefit and a source of legitimate scrutiny (Reich, 2016). This is a better starting point than either romantic philanthropy or automatic suspicion. The same institutional feature can protect courageous experimentation and permit disproportionate private influence.

The biblical concern begins even earlier than the modern foundation. Human beings are formed by what they love, hear, repeat, imitate, and reward. Scripture therefore treats the mind as a moral battleground. Believers are commanded not to be conformed to the age but to be transformed by renewed minds ([Romans 12:2](#)). They are warned not to be taken captive by philosophy and empty deceit according to human tradition rather than Christ ([Colossians 2:8](#)). Paul describes Christian obedience as taking thoughts captive to obey Christ ([2 Corinthians 10:3-5](#)). None of these texts teaches that every university, foundation, journalist, or psychologist is part of one demonic

command structure. They teach something more fundamental: ideas are not morally neutral, and the Christian must never outsource final authority over truth to the prestige of an institution.

2. From Charity to Strategic Philanthropy

Charity is ancient. Strategic philanthropy in its modern foundation form is comparatively recent. Traditional charity often addressed immediate need through almsgiving, churches, hospitals, schools, mutual aid, or local benevolence. The large twentieth-century foundation added a different ambition: use concentrated private capital to identify causes, build institutions, professionalize expertise, and solve problems at scale. The vocabulary varied. Andrew Carnegie spoke of the responsible administration of wealth. Rockefeller institutions often used the language of scientific philanthropy. Later foundations spoke of program strategy, systems change, field-building, measurable impact, social justice, and big bets. The common institutional move was from isolated gifts toward planned intervention in social systems.

This shift matters because the object of philanthropy changed. A donor who pays a student's tuition assists an individual. A donor who finances a school of education, funds teacher training, supports an accrediting body, commissions curriculum research, and endows a professional association can influence the environment through which thousands of teachers and millions of students are formed. A donor who pays for one medical treatment helps one patient. A donor who reshapes medical education, public-health research, and professional standards can influence an entire field. The scale of intervention is different, and so is the responsibility.

The large American foundations arose in an era of industrial fortunes, progressive reform, professionalization, and expanding universities. Their founders were not identical in motive or worldview. Nor did their institutions remain frozen in the intentions of their founders. Boards changed, staffs professionalized, social conditions shifted, and programs were revised. What makes Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford historically important is not that they can be reduced to a single ideology. It is that they became institutional vehicles capable of converting private wealth into long-duration influence over knowledge, education, science, public administration, international affairs, media, and culture.

That capacity can be demonstrated without rhetorical inflation. The General Education Board, the Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Ford Foundation all left extensive records: charters, annual reports, minutes, grant files, correspondence, program descriptions, financial statements, and archives. Those records show deliberate efforts to change institutions. The word "change" need not be smuggled in by critics. Foundations themselves use it. The historical question is what kind of change was intended, by what means, with what results, and with what degree of consent or accountability.

This is also where the phrase "social engineering" needs discipline. In ordinary polemics, the phrase can mean almost anything a critic dislikes. In a narrower analytical sense, social engineering occurs when actors deliberately design institutions, incentives, communications, environments, or choice structures in order to produce predictable changes in social behavior or norms. Under that definition, some programs described in this chapter are explicitly behavior-shaping and therefore legitimately described as social engineering. Others are better called education, persuasion, institution-building, advocacy, or philanthropy. The label should follow the evidence rather than substitute for it.

A stronger historical account also requires more than foundation self-description. Olivier Zunz (2012) places modern American philanthropy within a hybrid civic economy in which private fortunes, mass giving, nonprofit institutions, and public policy became increasingly interdependent. Inderjeet Parmar (2012), working from extensive foundation archives, emphasizes a more critical dimension: Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller philanthropy helped build durable intellectual and international-policy networks that could reinforce elite conceptions of expertise and American power. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Philanthropy can create genuine public goods while simultaneously concentrating agenda-setting capacity in institutions that are not electorally accountable. The relevant question is therefore not whether philanthropy is benevolent or sinister in the abstract, but how its resources, institutional relationships, and ideas become embedded in public life.

3. Rockefeller and the Architecture of Knowledge

The Rockefeller philanthropic system provides one of the clearest historical examples of field-building. The General Education Board (GEB) was incorporated in 1903 to promote education in the United States without distinction of race, sex, or creed. John D. Rockefeller, Sr., initially committed \$1 million, and the institution eventually spent \$324.6 million before closing in 1964. Its work included Southern education, agriculture, university administration, and medical education. Between 1913 and 1929 alone, its medical-education program distributed \$94 million to twenty-five medical schools (Iacobelli & Shubinski, 2022). These are not allegations from hostile literature. They are figures presented in the Rockefeller Archive Center's own historical account.

The results demonstrate both the promise and the power of strategic philanthropy. American medical education at the beginning of the twentieth century was uneven in admission standards, laboratory facilities, clinical training, and institutional quality. The GEB and Rockefeller Foundation supported reforms that strengthened university-based scientific medicine and public health. Those programs contributed to improvements that saved lives and raised professional standards. They also influenced which institutions survived, what educational model received capital, how medical schools organized faculty and hospitals, and which forms of professional knowledge acquired legitimacy. Philanthropy did not merely pay bills. It helped define the field.

The history of medical reform also shows how reports, professional standards, and capital can interact. Abraham Flexner's 1910 survey, commissioned by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, examined 155 medical schools in the United States and Canada and proposed a university-based, laboratory-intensive model of medical education (Flexner, 1910). The report itself did not possess legal force. Its significance increased because professional bodies, universities, states, and major philanthropies moved in broadly compatible directions, while the General Education Board supplied capital for institutions capable of meeting the new standards. This sequence illustrates a recurring mechanism of institutional power: diagnosis, credentialed recommendation, selective investment, professional adoption, and eventual normalization. It also cautions against monocausal claims, because reform emerged from several actors rather than from one foundation acting alone.

Rockefeller philanthropy extended the same institution-building logic into public health. The Rockefeller Foundation created its International Health Commission in 1913 to promote sanitation and scientific medicine, while related initiatives helped build public-health infrastructure, disease-control programs, professional training, and institutions such as the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health (Iacobelli, 2022). These programs produced substantial common-good benefits, yet they also illustrate how private philanthropy could define priorities, train specialists, standardize methods, and establish transnational networks of expertise. The appropriate historical judgment must hold both realities together rather than treating benefit as proof of neutrality or influence as proof of malign intent.

The same pattern appears in the social sciences. John D. Rockefeller created the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) in 1918. After Beardsley Rumel became director in 1922, the Memorial increasingly concentrated on building empirical, quantitative, interdisciplinary social research. The Rockefeller Archive Center describes the program as seeking a stronger body of knowledge about human capacities, motives, behavior, and practical social problems. LSRM funded fellowships, conferences, research institutions, and demonstration projects, and its approach influenced Rockefeller Foundation social-science work for decades (Smith, 2022). Rumel also worked with political scientist Charles Merriam and others in the establishment of the Social Science Research Council in 1923, helping create an enduring infrastructure for interdisciplinary social research (Rosenfield, 2022).

The importance of this history is not that empirical social science is intrinsically sinister. Reliable social knowledge can expose injustice, improve administration, test ineffective programs, and correct superstition. Nor does funding a social scientist prove that the scholar is a donor's agent. The important point is institutional. A foundation can decide that a field should exist at greater scale, determine what kinds of research infrastructure merit support, sponsor the training of specialists, and help create professional networks that later become self-sustaining. Once a field acquires departments, journals, fellowships, methods, professional societies, and funding channels, it can reproduce its assumptions without anyone issuing daily instructions.

This is a crucial mechanism of influence because it operates upstream from public controversy. Citizens usually encounter the final expert report, the credentialed spokesperson, or the policy recommendation. They rarely see the decades of institutional investment that created the research center, trained the experts, selected the methods, and established the categories through which the problem is understood. The influence may be legitimate and the conclusions correct. Yet the genealogy of authority still matters. A society that claims to follow "the science" should also ask how scientific fields are financed, which questions receive durable support, which methodological assumptions become standard, and whether dissenting approaches have meaningful access to institutions.

Current scale reinforces the point. The Rockefeller Foundation's 2025 audited financial statements reported total assets of approximately \$7.19 billion. Its 2025 impact report stated that it awarded more than \$350 million during the year and described a strategy built around large-scale initiatives, partnerships, technology, and the scaling of solutions (Rockefeller Foundation, 2026a, 2026b). The mission and programs have changed substantially since the era of the General Education Board, but the institutional principle remains: private capital can construct public capacity at a scale unavailable to ordinary citizens.

Independent scholarship strengthens this structural reading while warning against simplistic command theories. Parmar (2012) traces how major foundations financed universities, area studies, international-relations programs, expert networks, and public-opinion research that interacted with government and foreign-policy institutions. In contemporary education, Reckhow (2013) demonstrates that concentrated foundation investment can reshape urban reform coalitions and governance, while Tompkins-Stange (2016) shows through interviews and comparative institutional analysis that foundations differ materially in strategy, democratic orientation, and relationships with grantees. The picture is therefore one of organized influence and unequal capacity, not a single undifferentiated philanthropic mind.

The evidence verdict must therefore be differentiated. **ESTABLISHED:** Rockefeller philanthropy deliberately built educational, medical, administrative, and social-science institutions and helped define professional fields. **STRONGLY SUPPORTED:** such field-building creates durable agenda-setting and epistemic power because it influences what is studied, who is trained, and which institutions become authoritative. **UNSUPPORTED:** the mere existence of these grants proves that every recipient followed one secret Rockefeller doctrine or that all subsequent educational and scientific developments were centrally commanded by a family or hidden order.

4. Carnegie, Public Knowledge, and Cultural Infrastructure

Carnegie philanthropy illustrates a related but distinct form of influence: building public knowledge institutions and communication infrastructure. Carnegie Corporation of New York describes its enduring mission as advancing and diffusing knowledge and understanding. Its historical record includes support for universities, libraries, research, international studies, public broadcasting, and educational media (Carnegie Corporation of New York, n.d.-a). The scale and diversity of these interventions make a simple moral verdict impossible. Some became celebrated public goods. The mechanisms, however, are exactly the mechanisms this chapter must examine.

In 1938, Carnegie commissioned Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal to lead the research that became *An American Dilemma*. Whatever one thinks of every argument in that enormous study, the episode shows a foundation choosing a major social question, assembling research, and financing a work that later entered public and legal debate. In the 1960s, Carnegie supported the Commission on Educational Television. Its 1967 report helped shape the institutional framework that preceded the Public Broadcasting Act and the development of public television. Carnegie also supported Joan Ganz Cooney's study of whether television could be used to educate young children, a project that helped lead to the Children's Television Workshop and *Sesame Street* (Carnegie Corporation of New York, n.d.-a, 2017).

These are examples of deliberate cultural design conducted openly. A foundation identified a medium, commissioned expertise, gathered a network of participants, proposed an institutional form, and used private money to help create public capacity. The outcomes may be judged positively, negatively, or in mixed terms, but the causal chain is visible. No hidden committee is required to explain it.

The lesson for the investigation of power is important. Critics often imagine that "engineering consent" must involve secret propaganda inserted into society without any public record. Some of the most consequential cultural interventions are more ordinary. A donor can lawfully decide that a form of media is socially valuable, finance its development, and help create an institution that persists for generations. Over time, the institution develops its own staff, norms, incentives, audiences, and professional culture. Influence becomes embedded in infrastructure rather than in a single message.

Carnegie's current grants database makes the same mechanism visible in contemporary form. The Corporation publishes grantees, amounts, dates, programs, and descriptions. Recent awards include support for public media, educational institutions, international-affairs organizations, civic organizations, and knowledge projects (Carnegie Corporation of New York, n.d.-b). Transparency is significant because it allows citizens to distinguish documented funding from imagined command. It also permits a harder question: if private donors possess the capacity to sustain parts of a society's knowledge infrastructure, what accountability should accompany that power?

The democratic answer cannot be that private giving must cease. Government monopoly over knowledge would create even more dangerous concentration. Nor should the answer be that wealthy philanthropy is automatically disinterested. A plural society needs multiple centers of initiative, and it also needs disclosure, competition, methodological openness, donor transparency, and genuine independence for recipients. The Christian answer adds another requirement: gratitude for common-grace benefits must never become credulity about human institutions. Good fruit does not make an institution infallible, and real influence does not make it demonic.

5. Ford and the Institutionalization of Social Change

The Ford Foundation makes explicit what is often implicit in modern philanthropy: foundations can understand themselves as agents of social change. Edsel Ford created the foundation in 1936 for scientific, educational, and charitable purposes serving the public welfare. Bequests after the deaths of Edsel and Henry Ford transformed it into a philanthropic institution of exceptional scale. Its own current history describes decades of work in human rights, education reform, public-interest media, arts, government, and social justice. As of 2026, the foundation states that it stewards a \$16 billion endowment and makes about \$500 million in grants annually (Ford Foundation, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).

The postwar transformation was deliberate. The Study Committee led by H. Rowan Gaither examined the foundation's future and recommended a broad international and domestic program. The foundation subsequently invested in education, governance, economic development, social science, culture, rights, and international cooperation. As with Rockefeller and Carnegie, the significance lies not only in individual grants but in the construction of fields and institutions that survive particular program cycles.

Education provides a concrete example. Ford's Comprehensive School Improvement Program in the 1960s funded a network of projects intended to improve teacher development, educational practice, administration, and school organization. A later evaluation described approximately \$31 million in support across twenty-five projects (Ford Foundation, 1972). The program did not secretly seize school systems. It attempted to demonstrate models, generate evidence, and influence professional practice. This is a characteristic philanthropic mechanism: pilot, evaluate, publicize, replicate.

A more politically controversial example arose in New York City during the late 1960s, when Ford-supported initiatives were connected to experiments in school decentralization and community control. Ford's own retrospective history acknowledges both its involvement and the bitter conflict that followed around Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Those conflicts involved unions, parents, administrators, community activists, race, labor rights, and competing visions of democratic authority. The historical value of the episode is precisely that it resists a one-dimensional story. Foundation money mattered. Local actors also possessed their own agendas. Government decisions mattered. Institutional conflict was real. A funding relationship did not turn every participant into a puppet (Ford Foundation, 2008).

Ford's contemporary scale again shows why philanthropic power deserves political analysis even when no wrongdoing is alleged. The foundation openly selects priorities, finances institutions, supports advocacy and media,

and seeks durable social change. The democratic issue is not hidden intent. It is the ability of a private institution to deploy resources comparable to major public programs while remaining outside electoral authorization. That ability may support minorities and unpopular causes that electoral majorities neglect. It may also allow a narrow board and professional staff to elevate certain social priorities above others. Both propositions can be true at the same time.

Later scholarship on education philanthropy makes the mechanism more concrete. Reckhow (2013) follows foundation dollars into urban school politics and shows how private resources can alter coalitions, administrative capacity, and the speed with which reform proposals are implemented. Tompkins-Stange (2016), comparing Ford, Kellogg, Gates, and Broad, finds meaningful differences in how foundations define problems, choose partners, and understand democratic legitimacy. These findings weaken any theory of a perfectly unified philanthropic bloc, yet they strengthen the case that foundation strategy can have political effects far beyond the formal act of writing a grant.

This is why the simplistic question, "Is the Ford Foundation good or evil?" is analytically useless. Institutions do not acquire moral immunity from benevolent language, and they do not become conspiratorial merely because they seek change. The proper questions are narrower: What objective was declared? Who approved it? What grantee received the funds? What conditions governed the grant? What outputs resulted? Did public policy change? Were affected communities represented? Were counterarguments heard? Could the public identify the funding relationship? That is how rhetoric becomes evidence.

6. Grantmaking, Agenda-Setting, and the Power to Define the Problem

Grantmaking is not random generosity. Foundations publish missions, develop strategies, solicit or evaluate proposals, conduct due diligence, approve budgets, define reporting requirements, and assess outcomes. Even when they do not dictate a grantee's conclusions, they inevitably decide what they are willing to fund. That decision is a form of agenda-setting.

The distinction between controlling conclusions and controlling attention is one of the most important in this book. If a foundation gives a university \$10 million to study pandemic preparedness rather than agricultural productivity, it has not proved what the researchers will conclude. It has helped decide which problem receives laboratories, salaries, graduate students, conferences, data, prestige, and time. If the grant is renewed for a decade, the resulting field may attract further government and private funding. A topic once marginal can become a professional specialization.

Agenda-setting power is often cumulative rather than coercive. One grant rarely determines a national conversation. Hundreds of coordinated grants across universities, professional associations, NGOs, journalism, litigation, and public education can create an ecosystem. Recipients may disagree with one another, and donors may fund competing views. Yet the resource distribution still shapes the density of institutional attention. Questions with durable funding become easier to study, easier to staff, easier to publish, and easier to present as mature policy fields.

This mechanism also explains why donor intent is only one part of the analysis. A foundation may sincerely desire a public good. Its staff may act with integrity. Grantees may maintain intellectual independence. The structural effect can still be unequal agenda-setting. Reich's democratic critique is therefore more precise than accusations of omnipotent control: foundations possess unusual freedom to direct socially subsidized private resources toward public priorities without standing for election (Reich, 2016).

The proper safeguards are similarly structural. Grant databases should be accessible. Conflicts of interest should be disclosed. Universities and media organizations should publish major funding relationships. Research contracts should protect methods and publication from donor veto where appropriate. Governments should avoid treating foundation-funded consensus as equivalent to statutory authority. Professional fields should cultivate methodological pluralism and reproduce findings independently. Citizens should learn to ask who funded a project without assuming that funding answers whether the project is true.

Christians require one further discipline. "Who paid for this?" is an important question, but it is not the final question. A claim can be true even when funded by a bad actor, and false even when funded by a church. Truth is

not purified by the identity of its sponsor. The believer must test the claim itself. [Proverbs 18:17](#) requires cross-examination; [1 Thessalonians 5:21](#) requires testing everything and holding on to what is good. Funding analysis belongs inside discernment, not in place of it.

7. Education, Curriculum, Credentialing, and Epistemic Authority

Education is unusually attractive to reformers because it is both formative and reproductive. A law can change behavior for a season. Education can change the categories through which a generation understands law, history, personhood, authority, morality, economics, sexuality, religion, nation, science, and social obligation. For this reason, almost every ideological tradition has cared about education. The existence of educational ambition is not proof of conspiracy. It is a predictable feature of politics and culture.

Foundations gained influence in education through several mechanisms. They built schools and laboratories, endowed universities, supported teacher training, financed research, sponsored fellowships, helped establish professional fields, funded curriculum studies, and supported organizations that translated research into practice. These activities often brought real benefits. They also contributed to centralization of professional authority because nationally networked institutions could define standards that local communities had not independently developed.

Credentialing amplifies the effect. Modern societies need standards for medicine, engineering, law, teaching, research, and other complex professions. Yet a credential also functions as a gate. Whoever helps define what counts as accredited knowledge can influence which ideas enter institutions with the presumption of expertise. Professional associations, journals, universities, licensing systems, rankings, peer review, and grant panels form an epistemic architecture. Most participants do not experience themselves as political operatives. They are performing professional roles. The cumulative system can nevertheless privilege some assumptions and marginalize others.

This is where rhetoric about "controlled knowledge" should be refined rather than abandoned. Knowledge can be controlled in a strong sense when authorities suppress records, censor research, condition employment on ideological assent, or prevent publication. It can also be shaped in a softer sense through incentives: grants, hiring, prestige, publication opportunities, curriculum standards, disciplinary boundaries, and reputational sanctions. The second form is more common and more difficult to prove as intentional coordination. It often emerges from institutional culture rather than a secret directive.

The same architecture extends beyond classroom curriculum. In public health, philanthropic support helped create schools, research programs, disease-control campaigns, and transnational professional networks. In international relations, Parmar (2012) documents foundation support for university programs, fellowships, area studies, policy research, and public-opinion work that helped institutionalize particular forms of expertise. The important distinction is between building capacity and dictating doctrine. A donor can make an intellectual field more powerful and better connected without determining every conclusion reached inside it. Conversely, the absence of a written instruction does not make funding structurally irrelevant. Institutional influence often works by shaping the opportunity structure within which inquiry takes place.

The evidentiary challenge is therefore to distinguish three propositions. First, **ESTABLISHED**: large philanthropies have materially influenced educational institutions, research fields, and professional development. Second, **STRONGLY SUPPORTED**: funding and credentialing systems can shape agendas and the range of professionally rewarded questions. Third, **UNSUPPORTED as a general claim**: the education systems of entire nations are centrally controlled by one hidden group whose members dictate curriculum across institutions. Specific cases of censorship, ideological discrimination, or donor interference require specific evidence.

The Church has a particular responsibility here. Christian parents and congregations should not outsource formation to schools and then complain that schools form. Education is never merely the transfer of neutral facts. Every curriculum selects, orders, interprets, praises, and omits. The biblical response is not anti-intellectual withdrawal but deliberate formation in truth. Children and adults need Scripture, history, logic, scientific literacy, media literacy, and the capacity to distinguish evidence from authority claims. The Bereans were commended for

examining the Scriptures to test what they heard ([Acts 17:11](#)). That habit is the opposite of both official credulity and alternative-media credulity.

8. The Reece Committee: What Congress Actually Investigated

No serious chapter on foundation power can avoid the congressional investigations of the early 1950s. They are frequently invoked in expository literature as though Congress proved that a coordinated foundation conspiracy captured American education. The record is more complicated and more useful than that slogan.

The first investigation, commonly associated with Representative E. Eugene Cox, examined large tax-exempt foundations and comparable organizations. Its final report, submitted in January 1953, did not validate the broadest accusations then circulating about diversion of foundation funds to subversion. Representative B. Carroll Reece later pressed for a renewed inquiry. House Resolution 217 authorized the 1954 Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations to examine whether educational and philanthropic organizations were using tax-exempt resources contrary to their stated purposes, for un-American or subversive activities, for political purposes, for propaganda, or in attempts to influence legislation (U.S. House of Representatives, 1954a).

That mandate was broad. It was also inherently political because terms such as "un-American," "subversive," and "propaganda" depend heavily on definitions. The hearings therefore mixed legitimate questions about tax privilege, donor concentration, educational influence, and political activity with the ideological tensions of the early Cold War. The committee's majority report, House Report 2681, became the principal congressional document associated with claims that large foundations exercised unhealthy influence over education and public policy (U.S. House of Representatives, 1954b).

The investigation matters for at least four reasons. First, it demonstrates that concern about philanthropic power was not invented by later conspiracy literature. Congress itself considered the concentration of tax-exempt private power important enough to investigate. Second, the hearings generated a large documentary record containing testimony from foundation officials, scholars, tax administrators, critics, and staff researchers. Third, the committee's work was contested from within, which means its findings cannot responsibly be cited as unanimous congressional proof. Fourth, the investigation illustrates the methodological danger of collapsing staff hypotheses, witness testimony, majority conclusions, minority objections, and later recollections into one undifferentiated thing called "the Reece Committee findings."

The public hearings show that the committee was not asking a trivial question. A tax exemption is not merely a private privilege. It represents a public policy decision to permit assets to accumulate and be deployed for exempt purposes under rules different from ordinary commercial or taxable activity. Large foundations can therefore combine private governance with publicly subsidized longevity. The legitimacy of that arrangement depends on whether their activities remain sufficiently connected to charitable, educational, scientific, or other exempt purposes and whether political influence remains within lawful boundaries.

At the same time, congressional investigation is not revelation. Committees are composed of politicians, employ staffs with theories and preferences, select witnesses, frame questions, and operate in political climates. A congressional document must therefore be read according to its type. A hearing transcript records testimony, not necessarily truth. A staff memorandum records staff analysis, not necessarily committee adoption. A majority report represents the conclusions of those signing it, not a neutral judicial finding. A minority report is counter-evidence, not automatic refutation. The evidentiary value lies in comparing claims to underlying records.

This is especially important because later literature often quotes dramatic passages from staff research while omitting the staff's own qualifications. The most consequential example is the work of Norman Dodd.

9. Norman Dodd, the "Social Engineer," and the Evidence Boundary

Norman Dodd served as director of research for the Reece Committee. His 1954 report has become one of the most frequently cited documents in arguments that major foundations deliberately redirected American education

and governance toward collectivism, internationalism, and behavioral control. Some of his observations are historically valuable. Some of his inferences are sweeping. His own methodological caveat must therefore be placed at the center of any responsible use of his report.

Before presenting his major conclusions, Dodd wrote that the statements which followed resulted from studies that were "essentially exploratory" and that, "In no sense should they be considered proved" (Dodd, 1954, p. 5). That sentence is not a hostile critic's dismissal. It is Dodd's own warning. Any writer who cites his later allegations as settled congressional proof while omitting that qualification reverses the evidentiary status of the source.

Dodd's report nevertheless contains material worth investigating. His staff examined foundation grants, educational institutions, professional associations, and the growth of social science. He argued that large foundations, especially Carnegie and Rockefeller institutions, had supported trends toward international outlooks, expanded social-science research, greater federal administrative responsibility, and educational experimentation (Dodd, 1954, pp. 6-8). He became particularly concerned with the idea that human behavior might be treated as an object of systematic control. Later in the report he used the emerging title "social engineer" to describe specialists who believed social knowledge could be deliberately applied to reshape institutions and behavior (pp. 22-23).

The term captures a real twentieth-century development. Social scientists, advertisers, public-relations practitioners, military planners, public-health officials, educators, and later behavioral economists all developed techniques intended to predict or influence human behavior. Some did so openly and for purposes widely regarded as benign. Others were employed in propaganda or coercive state programs. The existence of behavioral ambition is therefore **ESTABLISHED**. What Dodd did not prove was that all such developments were coordinated by a single foundation command structure or that every grant served one concealed political program.

Dodd's treatment of university funding itself shows why nuance is necessary. He noted that institutions such as Columbia, Harvard, Chicago, and the University of California had received unusually large grants. Yet he also acknowledged a nonconspiratorial explanation: at an earlier stage, specialists capable of carrying out new fields of research were concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions, and foundation giving later spread more widely as expertise diffused (Dodd, 1954, pp. 4-5). That admission is analytically important. Concentration of funding can indicate elite preference, institutional quality, path dependence, network access, or strategic choice. It does not tell the investigator which explanation is correct without additional evidence.

Dodd also criticized what he believed was an overly empirical approach to social science and feared that foundations had enabled experts to exercise influence without adequate moral or constitutional restraints. Even readers who reject his political conclusions can recognize the enduring question. Technical knowledge can answer how to increase compliance, participation, uptake, or behavioral response. It cannot by itself answer whether the desired behavior is morally right. An efficient method can serve a righteous purpose or an evil one. The ethical problem begins when expertise assumes authority to define the good it is supposed merely to help achieve.

This is where Christian analysis can make a contribution that neither technocracy nor conspiracism can supply. The Bible does not teach that empirical knowledge is evil. Proverbs commends observation, skill, counsel, and wisdom. Luke was a physician. Paul reasoned in public. But Scripture denies that human beings can derive moral sovereignty from expertise. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge ([Proverbs 1:7](#)). Human wisdom detached from God can become boastful, ambitious, and destructive ([James 3:13-18](#)). A behavioral scientist may know how to alter a choice architecture and still be unable, from behavioral data alone, to say what a person ought to choose.

Dodd should therefore be read neither as a suppressed oracle nor as a crank to be discarded. He is a historically situated investigator who identified a genuine concentration of philanthropic and social-scientific power, raised questions that remain relevant, made broad inferences that require independent corroboration, and explicitly warned that his findings were exploratory. The strongest use of his work is to recover the questions and test them against foundation archives, grant records, educational history, and later developments.

10. Sutton, Carr, Coleman, and Claims of Hidden Educational Control

Investigative writers later transformed foundation criticism into more comprehensive theories of hidden command. Antony C. Sutton's *America's Secret Establishment* is especially relevant because it connects education, foundations, psychology, and elite networks through his thesis about Yale's Skull and Bones society, which he calls "The Order." Sutton argues that educational change was implemented through large private foundations and states that Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller, and other philanthropic institutions came under the influence or control of the Order. In his section on education, he treats foundation finance as the mechanism through which ideas associated with John Dewey and related reformers acquired national reach (Sutton, 2002, pp. 164-166).

Sutton's account contains two different kinds of proposition that must not be merged. The first is the documented proposition that large foundations financed universities, educational research, social science, professional formation, and institutional reform. This chapter has already established that proposition from foundation archives and official histories. The second is the command proposition that Skull and Bones, as a continuing secret organization, controlled the foundations and thereby directed the educational transformation. That stronger proposition requires evidence of organizational authority, instructions, selection mechanisms, funding decisions traceable to the alleged order, and a causal chain from secret membership to specific institutional outcomes. Sutton supplies associations and patterns, but the evidence reviewed for this chapter does not establish the comprehensive command structure he infers.

The same distinction applies to William Guy Carr and John Coleman. Carr repeatedly connects education, media, finance, and political transformation to a continuous hidden hierarchy. Earlier chapters have shown that some mechanisms he emphasized are real: secrecy can shelter coordination, propaganda can shape opinion, financiers can influence public affairs, and institutions can be captured. Yet his larger continuity thesis often depends on unverified links and derivative claims. Coleman goes further by assigning educational, psychological, media, and research institutions to the Committee of 300 (Carr, 1955; Coleman, 1992). Chapter 11 subjected that apex thesis to direct evidentiary tests and concluded that concentrated elite power is real while the specific sovereign Committee of 300 remains unsupported as a documented command-capable organization.

Those conclusions constrain the present chapter. It would be methodologically inconsistent to cite foundation grants as fresh proof of a Committee or Order already not established by the relevant evidence. The grants prove grants. The institutional relationships prove relationships. The educational reforms prove reforms. A hidden chain of command must be proved separately.

This restraint does not weaken the critique of power. It strengthens it. If a foundation openly spends hundreds of millions of dollars influencing education, journalism, public policy, or behavior, one does not need an unproven occult supervisor in order to ask whether its power is democratically accountable. If a university disciplines dissent, the documented policy matters more than a speculative genealogy. If a public-relations campaign manipulates fear, the campaign can be evaluated directly. The search for an invisible master can distract from visible mechanisms that already deserve scrutiny.

There is also a spiritual danger in totalizing explanations. Hidden-power literature can become an alternative priesthood in which readers are told that salvation from deception comes through access to secret knowledge possessed by a few interpreters. That pattern imitates the very elitism it condemns. Christianity offers no initiation into a superior class of geopolitical knowers. It offers reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ, the public gospel of a crucified and risen Lord. Secret knowledge does not justify sinners. Christ does.

11. Lippmann, Bernays, and the Modern Science of Consent

If the foundation history shows how institutions can finance knowledge, Walter Lippmann and Edward Bernays show how twentieth-century thinkers conceptualized the management of public opinion. Their importance lies precisely in the fact that they wrote openly. One does not need to infer that elite communicators discovered the power of mass persuasion. They said so.

Lippmann's *Public Opinion* appeared in 1922, when newspapers, mass literacy, advertising, cinema, telegraphy, and modern political campaigning were transforming public life. He argued that citizens do not respond directly to a complete objective world. They respond to mental representations of a world too large, distant, and complex to experience firsthand. He called this constructed interpretive environment a "pseudo-environment." Stereotypes, symbols, news selection, authority, and social expectations help form the pictures through which people act (Lippmann, 1922, chaps. 1-3).

This insight is foundational for understanding modern information power. Most citizens cannot personally verify a war zone, a laboratory result, a central-bank decision, a diplomatic negotiation, or a statistical model. They depend on mediating institutions. Whoever selects images, sources, experts, headlines, categories, and frames therefore participates in the construction of the public's practical reality. That does not mean the mediator is lying. It means mediation is unavoidable and therefore morally consequential.

Lippmann also wrote that the "manufacture of consent" had become capable of great refinement and connected that development to modern communication and persuasion (Lippmann, 1922, chap. 15). The phrase should not be caricatured. Lippmann was wrestling with a real democratic problem: mass publics cannot directly master every complex issue, yet government requires legitimacy. His solution gave greater importance to expertise and organized intelligence than radical democratic theory might prefer. The enduring danger is that a theory designed to manage complexity can become a rationale for paternalism.

Edward Bernays brought the logic of public opinion closer to professional public relations. In *Propaganda* he stated with remarkable candor: "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society" (Bernays, 1928, p. 9). He described modern societies as too complex for every citizen to investigate every matter independently and presented public-relations professionals as organizers of attention, symbols, associations, leaders, and communications. In 1947 he gave the practice its famous name in an article titled "The Engineering of Consent" (Bernays, 1947).

Bernays did not invent manipulation, advertising, political rhetoric, or propaganda. What he helped do was professionalize them. The propagandist became the public-relations counsel; the crude slogan became the coordinated campaign; the single advertisement became an integrated system of media placement, celebrity endorsement, expert authority, event creation, emotional association, and market research. The objective was not merely to state a proposition but to organize the environment in which the proposition would be received.

This history requires a distinction between persuasion and manipulation. Persuasion appeals to reasons, evidence, emotion, authority, or identity in an attempt to convince. Manipulation attempts to shape behavior while obscuring relevant aspects of the influence process, exploiting vulnerabilities, or bypassing reflective judgment. The boundary is not always clean. A public-health campaign may use emotionally powerful images to discourage smoking and still present accurate evidence. A political campaign may use fear selectively while technically avoiding false statements. Advertising may create associations unrelated to the functional qualities of a product. The ethical issue is not simply whether emotion is present. Human beings are emotional creatures. The issue is whether communication respects truth, agency, proportionality, and the audience's ability to judge.

The First World War and later mass politics demonstrated the potency of organized propaganda. Governments learned that populations could be mobilized through atrocity stories, patriotic symbols, enemy images, censorship, repetition, and emotional simplification. Commercial advertisers adapted similar insights to consumption. Political parties adapted them to electoral behavior. Foundations and universities funded research on communication, psychology, and public opinion. The lines among education, information, persuasion, and propaganda therefore became institutionally porous.

Jacques Ellul later argued that modern propaganda works most powerfully not as an isolated lie but as an environment that integrates political messages, social expectations, technology, information overload, and the individual's need for orientation (Ellul, 1965). That insight helps explain why fact-checking a single false claim does not solve the whole problem. An information system can be formally accurate at the sentence level while still shaping perception through selection, omission, timing, repetition, and unequal access to attention.

The Christian standard is both simpler and more demanding. Jesus identifies truth with freedom in a context of discipleship ([John 8:31-32](#)). Paul rejects deceitful methods in ministry and commends the open presentation of truth ([2 Corinthians 4:1-2](#)). Christians may persuade. The gospel itself calls people to repent and believe. But Christian persuasion is not licensed to fabricate evidence, manufacture false authority, manipulate fear, or treat persons as programmable objects. The messenger remains accountable to the God who searches hearts.

12. Advertising, Entertainment, and Cultural Normalization

Mass persuasion does not occur only in political speeches. Advertising and entertainment can be more formative because audiences approach them with lower defenses. A person knows a campaign advertisement is trying to win a vote. A television series, song, film, game, comedy routine, influencer feed, or lifestyle advertisement may shape intuitions without presenting itself as a political argument.

Cultural normalization works through repetition and identification. Characters embody desirable or contemptible traits. Stories define heroes and villains. Humor establishes what can be mocked. Advertising links products to status, sexuality, belonging, rebellion, security, or sophistication. Influencers turn commercial messages into parasocial relationships. None of these mechanisms is inherently evil. Stories teach because human beings are narrative creatures. The question is which moral imagination is being formed.

Foundations have long supported arts, public broadcasting, documentary production, museums, cultural institutions, and journalism. Such support can preserve artistic work that markets would neglect. It can give marginalized voices a platform. It can also influence which cultural projects receive institutional durability. Again, funding is not the same as script control. A grant to a theatre does not prove that the donor wrote the play. But the distribution of capital affects which institutions can hire, commission, tour, archive, and amplify.

The Carnegie-supported development of educational television is a transparent example of this power. The objective was not merely to entertain but to use a new medium for public education. *Sesame Street* deliberately combined entertainment with educational and behavioral goals for children. The program's success demonstrates a broader principle: culture can educate more effectively when audiences do not experience the message as a classroom lecture. That principle can serve literacy and kindness. It can also be used to normalize commercial, political, or moral assumptions.

The same analytical discipline should be applied to contemporary entertainment. It is easy to assemble a list of films or corporate campaigns and declare them evidence of a centrally scripted cultural agenda. Such claims usually fail the mechanism test. Similar themes can arise from market research, shared professional culture, activist pressure, changing audience demographics, executive decisions, talent networks, regulation, advertiser incentives, or ideological convergence without a single command center. To establish coordination, one needs contracts, campaign plans, funding records, communications, or other evidence linking actors to a common strategy.

Yet the absence of one central script does not make cultural convergence unreal. Industries recruit from similar universities, professional networks, cities, agencies, and social classes. Reputation incentives can penalize some positions and reward others. Advertisers can shape acceptable content. Platforms can alter distribution. Awards and criticism can reinforce professional norms. Cultural power is often ecological rather than hierarchical. The system forms creators even as creators form the system.

For Christians, the pastoral implication is direct. Media consumption is discipleship when repeated long enough. The issue is not that every secular story is propaganda. It is that repeated stories tutor desire. [Philippians 4:8](#) calls believers to attend to what is true, honorable, just, pure, lovely, commendable, morally excellent, and praiseworthy. That command is not a retreat from culture but a criterion for discernment within it. The question is not merely, "Is this entertaining?" but, "What does this teach me to love, fear, ridicule, excuse, or desire?"

13. Behavioral Science and the Governance of Choice

The progression from propaganda to behavioral science marks an important change in the techniques of influence. Propaganda often attempts to change what people believe or feel. Behavioral policy can change what

people do by altering defaults, forms, reminders, timing, social cues, friction, and the architecture of choice. The distinction is not absolute, but it matters. A person may behave differently without having consciously adopted a new ideology.

Behavioral economics developed partly from the observation that real human beings do not make decisions like perfectly informed, perfectly rational calculators. People procrastinate, follow defaults, imitate peers, overweight salient risks, avoid losses, respond to framing, and use mental shortcuts. These findings challenged simplified economic models and generated practical tools for policy design. The National Academies' 2023 consensus report on behavioral economics reviews both the policy contributions of the field and continuing questions about effect size, replication, context, ethics, and the transportability of interventions across populations (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2023).

Government adoption became explicit. In 2015 President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13707, "Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People." The order encouraged federal agencies to identify where behavioral findings could improve program outcomes, simplify access, structure choices, and test interventions. The Social and Behavioral Sciences Team and related federal evaluation work institutionalized the approach. The current Office of Evaluation Sciences (OES) at the U.S. General Services Administration states that it has completed more than 120 evaluations with dozens of federal agency partners since 2015 and continues to translate social and behavioral evidence into concrete recommendations that can be embedded and tested in government programs (Office of Evaluation Sciences, 2026a, 2026b).

This is one of the clearest cases in the chapter where "behavioral engineering" is not a pejorative invention. Governments openly study how communication design and choice architecture affect behavior. Examples include reminders, simplified forms, default options, timing changes, personalized messages, and social-norm comparisons. In many cases the goal is mundane and defensible: help eligible people complete benefits applications, reduce administrative errors, improve payment integrity, increase savings, or communicate more clearly. Rigorous randomized evaluation can protect citizens from ineffective programs by showing what actually works.

The ethical problem is not the existence of behavioral knowledge. Every form, website, classroom, supermarket, church bulletin, and ballot has a design, and design affects behavior. The ethical problem concerns power, transparency, purpose, reversibility, and respect for agency. Who selected the desired behavior? Does the intervention exploit cognitive vulnerability? Is the default easy to reject? Is the government merely simplifying a citizen's stated objective, or steering citizens toward a contested policy preference? Are results published when an intervention fails? Can independent researchers replicate the findings? Does the intervention preserve meaningful choice?

Behavioral techniques become especially consequential when combined with digital platforms. Online services can test interfaces at scale, measure response in real time, personalize messages, and optimize engagement. That capability can improve service delivery. It can also create environments in which users are continuously experimented upon or steered without understanding how the system was optimized. Detailed treatment of algorithmic information control belongs to Chapter 16, but the historical bridge is already visible. Bernays organized symbols and media channels; contemporary systems can organize interfaces, defaults, ranking, personalization, and feedback loops.

The strongest evidentiary conclusion is therefore straightforward. **ESTABLISHED:** governments and organizations deliberately use behavioral science to influence choices and improve targeted outcomes. **STRONGLY SUPPORTED:** choice architecture can alter behavior without changing underlying beliefs and therefore raises distinctive ethical questions about autonomy and transparency. **UNSUPPORTED:** the existence of behavioral-science units proves a covert plan to psychologically enslave populations. The programs are diverse, many are public, and their purposes must be assessed case by case.

The Christian concern again reaches the level of personhood. Human beings are not merely bundles of predictable biases to be optimized. They are creatures made in the image of God, morally responsible and worthy of truthful treatment. Good governance may remove needless confusion and help citizens act on informed choices. It should not reduce persons to manipulable units. The more sophisticated persuasion becomes, the more urgent the ancient command becomes: "Speak the truth, each one to his neighbor" ([Ephesians 4:25](#)).

14. Media Philanthropy, Fact-Checking, and the New Information Gatekeepers

The financial crisis of journalism has opened a new field for philanthropy. Declining local advertising revenue, fragmented audiences, platform competition, subscription fatigue, and the cost of investigative reporting have left many news organizations searching for alternative support. Foundations have entered that gap. The result can preserve journalism that markets would otherwise abandon. It also creates a new relationship between private donors and the institutions that mediate public reality.

The Gates Foundation's Global Media Partnerships program provides a useful contemporary case because its own disclosures make both the influence and the safeguards visible. The foundation states that it funds news organizations and nonprofit partners to expand reporting on global health and development. It lists support for specialized desks, reporting projects, and fact-checking organizations, including Africa Check. At the same time, it explicitly requires transparency about the funding relationship and states that grantees must retain creative and editorial independence, with no obligation to cover the foundation favorably or adopt the foundation's positions (Gates Foundation, n.d.-a).

This evidence supports two propositions at once. First, **ESTABLISHED**: a major philanthropy intentionally increases the amount and capacity of journalism devoted to topics it considers important. That is agenda-setting. Second, **NOT ESTABLISHED by the grant relationship alone**: the donor controls editorial conclusions. Indeed, the program's stated policy expressly disclaims that kind of control. A responsible investigation must preserve both facts rather than choosing whichever fits a preferred narrative.

The distinction is not trivial. Funding a global-health desk changes the probability that global health will receive sustained professional attention. It may finance reporters, travel, data work, specialist editors, and fact-checking. That can improve public knowledge. It can also create asymmetry: issues without philanthropic backing may receive less attention even when citizens consider them important. Agenda influence can therefore exist in the absence of editorial coercion.

The scale of modern media philanthropy is also increasing. Ford Foundation and other funders announced the Press Forward initiative with a goal of mobilizing more than \$500 million to strengthen local news in the United States. The public rationale connected reliable local information to democratic health (Ford Foundation, 2023). Carnegie Corporation continues to fund public media and other knowledge institutions. Gates supports media and fact-checking in health and development. These programs are open enough to be studied from grant records, which is precisely why allegations should be specific.

Fact-checking deserves particular care because it combines epistemic authority with public labeling. In principle, independent verification is a public good. Journalists and citizens need mechanisms for checking claims, sources, images, statistics, and quotations. In practice, fact-checking can itself make errors, select some claims rather than others, depend on contested expert authorities, or collapse empirical questions into policy judgments. A label such as "false," "misleading," or "missing context" can affect reputation and distribution. The ethical solution is not to abolish verification. It is to make verification more transparent: publish sources, explain standards, correct mistakes, distinguish fact from inference, disclose funding, and permit reasoned appeal.

The existence of foundation-funded fact-checking does not by itself establish censorship. Censorship requires a mechanism of suppression, legal coercion, platform action, contractual pressure, or comparable restriction. Chapter 16 will examine platform moderation, government-platform communication, information governance, and algorithmic visibility with the documentation appropriate to those claims. The narrower point here is that philanthropy increasingly finances institutions that participate in the epistemic ecosystem surrounding news, misinformation, media literacy, and public trust.

For Christians, this modern ecology creates a temptation in both directions. One temptation is to trust institutional labels without reading the evidence. The other is to assume that a claim becomes true because a fact-checker rejected it. Neither posture is discernment. [Proverbs 14:15](#) says the inexperienced believe anything, while the sensible watch their steps. The Christian should inspect primary evidence where possible, compare competing accounts, distinguish correction from censorship, and refuse the emotional reward of belonging to a camp that never admits error.

15. Philanthrocapitalism, NGOs, and Public-Private Cultural Power

The twenty-first-century philanthropic environment differs from the era of Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford in scale, speed, technology, and organizational density. Very large foundations now operate through global networks that include governments, international organizations, universities, corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media, data systems, advocacy organizations, and local implementers. The term "philanthrocapitalism" is often used to describe the application of business methods, strategic investment, measurement, entrepreneurship, and large private fortunes to public problems. The term can be descriptive or critical depending on the author.

The Gates Foundation illustrates the scale. Its 2025 annual reporting records approximately \$8.5 billion in charitable support for the year (Gates Foundation, 2026). Ford reports a \$16 billion endowment and roughly \$500 million in annual grants, while Rockefeller reported approximately \$7.19 billion in total assets at the end of 2025 (Ford Foundation, n.d.-b; Rockefeller Foundation, 2026a). These institutions differ in mission, governance, and program design, but together they demonstrate a basic reality: private philanthropy can operate at quasi-governmental scale within selected policy domains.

Scale changes relationships. A small charity normally adapts to the policy environment around it. A very large foundation can help create the environment. It can convene ministries, finance data systems, underwrite research, fund NGOs, sponsor communications, support demonstration projects, recruit technical partners, and use grants to reduce the risk of innovations that governments or firms are reluctant to finance. Such capacity can accelerate beneficial work. It can also allow unelected institutions to become agenda entrepreneurs within public systems.

Public-private partnership is therefore neither inherently sinister nor inherently neutral. Governments routinely need expertise, capital, logistics, research, and local networks they do not possess internally. Partnerships can deliver vaccines, schools, agricultural research, humanitarian relief, and technology. Yet public authority can become blurred when private partners influence problem definitions, metrics, procurement, evidence standards, or implementation while elected institutions retain only formal responsibility.

NGOs occupy a similar middle position. They can represent neglected communities, monitor abuses, provide services, conduct research, and challenge governments. They can also become dependent on donor priorities. A donor does not need to telephone every grantee with instructions if renewal funding, proposal categories, reporting metrics, and professional prestige already structure incentives. This is not proof that NGOs lack agency. Many resist donors, diversify funding, or change strategies. It is evidence that financial dependence is a variable that should be studied rather than ignored.

The same applies to universities. A modern research institution may receive government grants, corporate contracts, foundation funding, tuition revenue, gifts, and endowment income simultaneously. No single donor necessarily controls it. Yet funding composition can influence hiring, centers, datasets, equipment, fellowships, and research questions. The strongest studies of influence therefore follow money and governance at project level instead of labeling an entire university captured because it received one grant.

Modern philanthropy also extends from grantmaking into investment. Mission-related investing and program-related investing attempt to align capital markets with philanthropic objectives. Ford, for example, announced a major mission-related investment commitment from its endowment in 2017. Such strategies expand the instruments through which foundations pursue change beyond ordinary grants. The ethical implications are complex because investment can create both financial return and policy leverage.

This chapter therefore rejects two comforting myths. The first is the myth of pure benevolence: because an institution is charitable, its influence is automatically beyond scrutiny. The second is the myth of total command: because large foundations cooperate with governments, media, universities, and NGOs, they must form one unified hidden government. The documentary record supports neither extreme. It supports something more concrete and, in some ways, more sobering: large private institutions can exercise durable agenda-setting power within public systems while remaining legally private, and the resulting networks can converge without a single supreme commander.

That is exactly the form of power democratic societies find hardest to see. Formal sovereignty remains with public institutions. Operational capacity is distributed across public-private networks. Accountability can therefore become fragmented. When a policy succeeds, every participant may claim credit. When it fails, each can say another actor made the decisive choice. The solution is not paranoid simplification. It is traceability: identify the grant, contract, decision, advisory role, data source, implementing body, legal authority, and outcome.

16. Evidentiary Synthesis: What "Social Engineering" Can and Cannot Mean

The evidence reviewed in this chapter supports a strong case for institutional influence without requiring a totalizing hidden-command thesis. The most defensible conclusions are not weaker because they are carefully bounded. They are stronger because each one specifies what the documentary record actually establishes and where inference must stop.

ESTABLISHED: large private foundations have materially shaped education, medicine, public health, social science, culture, journalism, and policy research through sustained grantmaking and institution-building. Foundation archives, annual reports, historical grant records, commissioned studies, and financial disclosures show intentional efforts to create institutions, develop professional fields, train personnel, and support durable programs. Rockefeller's medical and social-science programs, Carnegie's educational-media work, and Ford's long record of institutionally oriented grantmaking are representative examples.

STRONGLY SUPPORTED: foundation funding can exercise agenda-setting power even when a donor does not control a grantee's conclusions. Strategic priorities determine which questions attract money, staff, fellowships, data, conferences, media attention, and institutional continuity. Reich (2016), Parmar (2012), Reckhow (2013), and Tompkins-Stange (2016) approach the issue from different perspectives, but together they support the conclusion that philanthropic resources can influence public agendas while leaving substantial room for recipient autonomy, institutional conflict, and unintended outcomes.

ESTABLISHED WITH IMPORTANT QUALIFICATIONS: the Reece Committee investigated the political and educational influence of tax-exempt foundations, and Norman Dodd raised serious concerns about foundation-supported social science and the deliberate application of expertise to human behavior. What the inquiry did not establish was a unanimous congressional finding that the major foundations formed one coordinated conspiracy to control American education and government. Dodd himself described his major statements as exploratory and not proved. His report is therefore a valuable evidentiary lead and historical argument, not a substitute for corroboration.

WEAKLY SUPPORTED TO UNSUPPORTED AS COMMAND CLAIMS: the stronger theses advanced by Sutton, Carr, and Coleman that a continuing secret order or apex committee controlled the major foundations and thereby directed educational and cultural change. Their works identify real institutions, relationships, and recurring mechanisms, but the evidence examined here does not establish the instruction-and-control chain required for comprehensive organizational command. Association, overlapping membership, shared priorities, and funding remain relevant evidence, but they cannot carry the weight of sovereignty without additional documentation.

ESTABLISHED: Lippmann and Bernays openly theorized the management of public opinion, and modern governments openly use behavioral science and choice architecture to influence conduct in public programs. The historical continuity is not one of identical organizations or motives but of an increasingly explicit science of attention, framing, persuasion, and behavioral design. What remains unsupported is the indiscriminate claim that every nudge, public communication, or behavioral intervention constitutes coercive mind control. Coercion, deception, opacity, and loss of meaningful choice must be demonstrated in the particular case.

STRONGLY SUPPORTED: philanthropic funding of journalism, fact-checking, cultural production, and civic-information projects creates legitimate agenda-setting and conflict-of-interest questions. A grant can expand the amount of professional attention devoted to a donor-prioritized topic and can help sustain particular institutions. Yet a funding relationship alone does not prove editorial command, especially where contractual or published

policies protect editorial independence. The responsible inference is influence over capacity and attention unless evidence demonstrates more.

ESTABLISHED: contemporary philanthropy operates through dense public-private networks that connect governments, universities, NGOs, media organizations, corporations, researchers, and international institutions. These networks can distribute operational capacity and blur accountability. It remains **UNSUPPORTED**, however, to infer from overlap and convergence alone that all such institutions are subordinate to one documented hidden world directorate. The historical burden is to trace actual decisions, contracts, governance, funding, communications, and implementation rather than to substitute a diagram of connections for evidence of command.

The central verdict is therefore neither dismissive nor sensational. **Social engineering is real when the term refers to documented efforts to shape behavior, institutional design, communication environments, professional fields, or social norms.** It becomes analytically misleading when every act of education, philanthropy, persuasion, or policy design is labeled engineering regardless of mechanism. It becomes historically irresponsible when documented influence is converted into proof of an unverified sovereign cabal.

This distinction matters because exaggeration protects the very power it claims to expose. A weak claim can be disproved, and critics may then use its failure to dismiss stronger evidence beside it. The Church should not hand defenders of unaccountable power such an easy victory. If foundation funding shapes a field, prove the funding. If a donor vetoed a publication, produce the contract or correspondence. If a government used behavioral techniques, identify the program. If a platform suppressed lawful speech under external pressure, document the communications. If a secret organization directed an institution, establish the chain. Precision is not cowardice. It is truthfulness.

17. Biblical Discernment: The Battle for the Mind

The historical record now places the theological question in sharper focus. The Christian does not need to believe in a single earthly control room in order to recognize a battle over human perception. Scripture already teaches that sin darkens understanding, false teachers exploit hearers, rulers can deceive, crowds can be manipulated, merchants can seduce through luxury, and spiritual powers operate through systems of rebellion. The biblical category is broader than conspiracy and deeper than sociology.

The New Testament repeatedly locates spiritual warfare in the realm of truth, worship, desire, and allegiance. Satan is described as a liar and the father of lies ([John 8:44](#)). Paul warns that the god of this age blinds unbelieving minds to the light of the gospel ([2 Corinthians 4:4](#)). Believers are commanded to put on the full armor of God, beginning with truth, righteousness, gospel readiness, faith, salvation, the Word of God, and prayer ([Ephesians 6:10-18](#)). The Christian response to an age of persuasion is therefore not counter-manipulation. It is truth, holiness, Scripture, prayer, courage, and faithful witness.

This also corrects a common misunderstanding of Sola Scriptura. Scripture alone is the final infallible rule for Christian faith and obedience. That does not mean Christians learn nothing from archives, economics, medicine, history, or science. It means no foundation report, government agency, academic consensus, intelligence source, alternative researcher, pastor, influencer, or fact-checking organization may occupy the place of God's written Word. Empirical claims should be tested by empirical evidence. Moral and theological claims must ultimately be judged under Scripture.

Biblically, deception often advances through counterfeit and distortion rather than through the simple presentation of an obvious falsehood. In [Genesis 3:1-6](#), the serpent questions, reframes, and contradicts God's word while appealing to human desire for autonomy. Paul likewise warns in [2 Corinthians 11:14](#) that Satan disguises himself as an angel of light. This is a theological pattern, not historical proof against any named foundation, university, government, or media organization. Its relevance is moral and spiritual: respectable language, credentialed authority, partial truth, or benevolent intent cannot exempt an idea from testing. The Christian must judge both the claim and the fruit by truth revealed in Scripture and by evidence appropriate to the factual question.

The danger of controlled knowledge becomes spiritually serious when institutional prestige is converted into unquestionable authority. "Experts say" can become a secular priestly formula if the public is denied the underlying

evidence, uncertainty, or dissent. But the opposite slogan, "They are all lying," can become an equally irrational creed. Christians should be the least manipulable people in a society because they have no need to protect an earthly tribe from truth. If an official institution is correct, we can acknowledge it. If an alternative researcher is wrong, we can correct him. If our preferred narrative fails, our faith does not fail because Christ was never dependent on our theory.

Discernment also requires emotional discipline. Propaganda frequently succeeds by attaching identity to belief. Once a claim becomes a badge of loyalty, contrary evidence feels like betrayal. The believer must refuse that bondage. [James 1:19-20](#) commands quickness to listen, slowness to speak, and slowness to anger. [2 Timothy 2:24-26](#) requires the Lord's servant to correct opponents with gentleness. These are not soft virtues for peaceful times. They are defenses against manipulation.

The Church should therefore strengthen its own institutions of formation without imitating technocratic control. Parents should teach children how to read Scripture in context, examine evidence, understand logical fallacies, recognize emotional manipulation, and distinguish fact from interpretation. Churches should recover catechesis, biblical theology, church history, and disciplined discipleship. Christian schools and universities should cultivate genuine scholarship rather than ideological insulation. Pastors should resist the temptation to turn every headline into prophecy and should also resist the fear of addressing documented evil. Truthful courage is the middle path.

Christian institutions also need financial transparency. It would be hypocrisy to criticize foundation influence while hiding church donors, conflicts of interest, sponsored research, or denominational politics. The ethics demanded of Rockefeller, Ford, Gates, governments, and media apply first to us. [1 Peter 4:17](#) reminds believers that judgment begins with God's household. The Church's credibility in exposing deception depends partly on refusing deception within its own structures.

Most importantly, the Christian message is not a rival program for engineering humanity. The gospel does not regenerate people through optimized choice architecture. New birth is the work of the Holy Spirit. The Church proclaims Christ crucified and risen, calls sinners to repent and believe, teaches all that Christ commanded, and trusts God to transform hearts. Political systems can restrain evil. Education can form habits. Media can persuade. Behavioral design can increase compliance. None of them can reconcile a sinner to God.

Spiritual warfare must also be interpreted from the victory of Christ rather than from fascination with the reach of darkness. At the cross, Christ disarmed the rulers and authorities and triumphed over them ([Colossians 2:15](#)). The risen Lord is seated above every ruler, authority, power, and dominion, with all things placed under His feet ([Ephesians 1:20-23](#)). Satan is real, deceptive, and dangerous, but he is created, limited, judged, and never sovereign. No foundation endowment, media system, behavioral apparatus, or transnational network can overrule the throne of Christ. This truth frees believers to investigate courageously without granting evil the aura of omnipotence.

18. The Church, the Gospel, and the Blessed Hope

The investigation of foundations and persuasion ends where Christian discernment must always end: not with fascination with manipulators, but with allegiance to Jesus Christ. A reader could learn the history of Rockefeller philanthropy, understand every Reece Committee document, recognize Bernays's techniques, identify behavioral nudges, trace media grants, and still remain spiritually deceived. The greatest captivity is not ignorance of elite networks. It is slavery to sin.

Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners. He lived without sin, died as the atoning sacrifice for His people, and rose bodily from the dead. No foundation, university, government, intelligence service, platform, therapist, public-relations expert, or revolutionary can provide what He provides: forgiveness, reconciliation with God, a new heart, the indwelling Spirit, and eternal life. The proper response to the exposure of manipulation is therefore not merely to become harder to manipulate. It is to repent, believe the gospel, and come under the lordship of the One who is the truth ([John 14:6](#)).

For believers, readiness means refusing both sleep and panic. The world does not need to become completely centralized before Christians are commanded to watch. The Church has always lived in an age of deception, idolatry, political pride, and spiritual conflict. What may change is the technological and institutional capacity

through which those ancient sins are organized. The historical record of philanthropy, propaganda, behavioral science, and media systems shows that human beings have developed increasingly sophisticated means of shaping attention and conduct. Later chapters will examine whether contemporary governance, digital systems, and information architectures create forms of convergence relevant to biblical prophecy. This chapter does not declare those systems the fulfillment of a specific prophecy. It establishes mechanisms that make large-scale coordination and persuasion historically intelligible.

This book adopts a pre-tribulation understanding of the Blessed Hope while acknowledging that faithful evangelical Christians differ about the timing of the rapture. Nothing in this chapter licenses date-setting. The promise of Christ's coming does not rest on decoding a foundation grant, a media campaign, an executive order, or an algorithm. It rests on the apostolic Word. The Lord will gather His people to Himself ([1 Thessalonians 4:13-18](#)); believers are therefore to remain awake and self-controlled as children of light ([1 Thessalonians 5:4-11](#)); and the grace of God trains us to live sensibly, righteously, and godly while waiting for the appearing of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ ([Titus 2:11-14](#)). Pre-tribulation expectancy is therefore not an invitation to prophetic arithmetic but a summons to purification and heavenly-minded fidelity. [1 John 3:2-3](#) joins the hope of seeing Christ to the believer's purification, while [Philippians 3:20-21](#) locates Christian citizenship in heaven and directs hope toward the Savior who will transform our mortal bodies. The more seriously the Church expects Christ, the less excuse it has for panic, compromise, slander, or spiritual sleep.

That hope changes how the Church confronts engineered consent. We do not need the approval of the age. We do not need to be emotionally synchronized with every campaign. We do not need to panic when institutions converge or despair when truth is marginalized. We belong to a kingdom that cannot be engineered into existence by human power and cannot be engineered out of existence by human power. Christ builds His Church.

The practical call is therefore sober. Guard your mind without closing it. Teach your children before the culture teaches them. Read primary documents before repeating dramatic claims. Demand transparency from institutions you trust as well as those you distrust. Refuse to slander whole populations because of the actions of elites. Do not confuse professional consensus with infallibility or dissent with holiness. Support truthful journalism and serious scholarship. Build Christian institutions that can survive without selling their conscience. Pray for rulers, scholars, teachers, journalists, donors, artists, and scientists. Speak the truth in love. Preach the gospel. Live ready.

The next chapter enters a darker archive. Philanthropic influence is often public, lawful, and traceable through grants and institutional records. Intelligence services exist precisely to operate, at least in part, beyond public view. Chapter 13 will examine documented covert operations, propaganda, surveillance, infiltration, psychological experimentation, and institutional deception through declassified records and official investigations. The lesson of the present chapter must accompany us there: real covert action is best exposed by evidence strong enough that imagination is unnecessary.

REFERENCES

-
- Bernays, E. L. (1928). *Propaganda*. Horace Liveright. <https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78634>
- Bernays, E. L. (1947). The engineering of consent. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 250(1), 113-120. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271624725000116>
- Carnegie Corporation of New York. (2017, November 3). *Public broadcasting turns 50*. <https://www.carnegie.org/article/public-broadcasting-turns-50/>
- Carnegie Corporation of New York. (n.d.-a). *History*. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://www.carnegie.org/about/history/>
- Carnegie Corporation of New York. (n.d.-b). *Grants database*. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://www.carnegie.org/grants/grants-database/>
- Carr, W. G. (1955). *Pawns in the game*. Federation of Christian Laymen.
- Coleman, J. (1992). *Conspirators' hierarchy: The story of the Committee of 300*. America West Publishers.
- Dodd, N. (1954). *A report from Norman Dodd, Director of Research, covering his direction of the staff of the Special Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate Tax Exempt Foundations for the six months' period November 1, 1953-April 30, 1954*. Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, U.S. House of Representatives. <https://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupid?key=olbp96865>

- Ellul, J. (1965). *Propaganda: The formation of men's attitudes* (K. Kellen & J. Lerner, Trans.). Alfred A. Knopf.
- Flexner, A. (1910). *Medical education in the United States and Canada: A report to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching* (Bulletin No. 4). Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. https://archive.carnegiefoundation.org/publications/pdfs/elibrary/Carnegie_Flexner_Report.pdf
- Ford Foundation. (1972). *A foundation goes to school: The Ford Foundation Comprehensive School Improvement Program, 1960-1970*. ERIC. <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED071190>
- Ford Foundation. (2008). *Strategies for improving public education: A foundation returns to school*. <https://www.fordfoundation.org/learning/library/research-reports/strategies-for-improving-public-education-a-foundation-returns-to-school/>
- Ford Foundation. (2023, September 7). *New funder coalition Press Forward will award more than \$500 million to revitalize local news*. <https://www.fordfoundation.org/news-and-stories/news-and-press/news/new-funder-coalition-press-forward-will-award-more-than-500-million-to-revitalize-local-news/>
- Ford Foundation. (n.d.-a). *Our origins*. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://www.fordfoundation.org/about/about-the-ford-foundation/our-origins/>
- Ford Foundation. (n.d.-b). *How we make grants*. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/our-grants/how-we-make-grants/>
- Gates Foundation. (2026). *Annual report 2025*. <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/financials/annual-reports/annual-report-2025>
- Gates Foundation. (n.d.-a). *Global media partnerships*. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/our-work/programs/global-policy-and-advocacy/global-media-partnerships>
- Iacobelli, T. (2022, January 6). *The Rockefeller Foundation's 20th-century global fight against disease*. REsource: Rockefeller Archive Center. <https://resource.rockarch.org/story/the-rockefeller-foundations-20th-century-global-fight-against-disease/>
- Iacobelli, T., & Shubinski, B. (2022, January 5). "Without distinction of race, sex, or creed": The General Education Board, 1903-1964. REsource: Rockefeller Archive Center. <https://resource.rockarch.org/story/the-general-education-board-1903-1964/>
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public opinion*. Harcourt, Brace and Company. <https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/6456>
- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2023). *Behavioral economics: Policy impact and future directions*. The National Academies Press. <https://doi.org/10.17226/26874>
- Office of Evaluation Sciences. (2026a). *Evaluations*. U.S. General Services Administration. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://oes.gsa.gov/work/>
- Office of Evaluation Sciences. (2026b). *OES evaluation process*. U.S. General Services Administration. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from <https://oes.gsa.gov/projectprocess/>
- Obama, B. H. (2015, September 15). *Executive Order 13707: Using behavioral science insights to better serve the American people*. Executive Office of the President. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-behavioral-science-insights-better-serve-American/>
- Parmar, I. (2012). *Foundations of the American century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the rise of American power*. Columbia University Press.
- Reckhow, S. (2013). *Follow the money: How foundation dollars change public school politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Reich, R. (2016). Repugnant to the whole idea of democracy? On the role of foundations in democratic societies. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 49(3), 466-472. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096516000718>
- Rockefeller Foundation. (2026a). *2025 financial statements*. <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2025-The-Rockefeller-Foundation-Financial-Statements.pdf>
- Rockefeller Foundation. (2026b). *2025 impact report: Big bets, real results*. <https://impactreport.rockefellerfoundation.org/>
- Rosenfield, P. L. (2022, January 12). *History of the Social Science Research Council*. REsource: Rockefeller Archive Center. <https://resource.rockarch.org/story/creation-and-history-of-social-science-research-council/>
- Smith, J. A. (2022, January 13). *Legitimizing the social sciences: The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial in the 1920s*. REsource: Rockefeller Archive Center. <https://resource.rockarch.org/story/history-of-laura-spelman-rockefeller-memorial-legitimizing-social-sciences-1920s/>
- Sutton, A. C. (2002). *America's secret establishment: An introduction to the Order of Skull & Bones* (Updated reprint). TrineDay. (Original work published 1983)
- Tompkins-Stange, M. E. (2016). *Policy patrons: Philanthropy, education reform, and the politics of influence*. Harvard Education Press.
- U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and Other Organizations. (1953). *Final report of the Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and Other Organizations* (H. Rep. No. 82-2514). U.S. Government Printing Office.

- U.S. House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations. (1954a). *Tax-exempt foundations: Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, second session, on H. Res. 217*. U.S. Government Printing Office. <https://archive.org/details/1954-tax-exempt-foundations-part-1>
- U.S. House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations. (1954b). *Tax-exempt foundations: Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations* (H. Rep. No. 83-2681). U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Zunz, O. (2012). *Philanthropy in America: A history*. Princeton University Press.